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State, religion and difference 
If the relationship between the state and religion is not the burning (in two 
senses) issue that it was in centuries past, yet it has received a small but steady glow 
of attention in political philosophy over the last decade (eg Audi 1989 & 1991; 
Weithman 1991; Macedo 1995; Rawls 1995, especially the Introduction; Connolly 
1995, especially chapters 4 & 6). In large part, this interest has been stimulated by 
debates over the extent to which societies that claim liberal political foundations can 
accommodate cultural difference. Such debates reflect a growing unease about whether 
liberalism's hands-off policy of 'benign neglect' really guarantees freedom for 
vulnerable minorities, or whether it merely abandons them to the attrition of 
indifference or even, from time to time, hostility. Liberalism's defenders (such as 
John Rawls) and critics (such as William Connolly) have tried to find ways in which 
societies which profess no theological foundation can make room for religious 
diversity without at the same time buying into sectarian squabbles or hinting at a 
return to theocracy. 
I shall argue that such analyses run into problems because their conception of 
religion is too narrow. First, taking Rawls as a case in point, I suggest that his and 
his followers' attempts to model a realm of public debate from which religious values 
are excluded rely on too constricted a notion of religion. Indigenous Australian 
land-based religious traditions offer an example of religious "comprehensive doctrine" 
which cannot, without doing violence to its very structure, be kept out of public 
debate, for example about the protection of sacred sites; but they are nevertheless 
sources of cultural and social meaning which many liberals would want to see as 
having a legitimate place in a diverse society. 
Second, such theorists cast too narrow a net in their analysis of the connections 
between religious and other kinds of meaning systems, and especially of the 
relationship between meaning systems and the world of material interactions of 
which they try to make sense. As a result, they largely overlook the metaphysics of 
economic expansion which lies at the heart of the supposedly secular capitalist state. 
The apparently odd inclusion of market ideology under the heading of metaphysics 
gains some support from a consideration of its language and imagery, but more from 
looking at the structural position which it occupies vis-a-vis other meaning systems 
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in capitalist society. 
As a way into these issues, I shall begin to sketch an outline of various ways in 
which modern states deliberately try to exclude religious assumptions, symbols, 
authorities and so on from their political and legal structure. 
State atheism 
One response to religion by a would-be secular state is to outlaw, or at least 
strongly discourage, religion of any but the most privatised sort, as occurred in the 
former Soviet Union. Formally, such moves have sometimes been interpreted as an 
attempt to put atheism in the position that a state religion once held. In practice, 
however, excising religious symbols and public practices from a society where they 
have once held a central place seems to create holes which demand positive rather 
than negative content. In her cross-cultural study of motherhood, Ourselves as 
Mothers, Sheila Kitzinger describes an ersatz 'baptismal' ceremony- complete with 
piped music, stained glass and ritual incantations - for a baby leaving hospital and 
being launched into its life as a Soviet citizen: 
The meeting of a father and other members of the family with a newborn child, 
treated as a private and intimate event in Western countries, became in 
Communist society a formal and ritual entry into the culture, one in which the 
baby was symbolically exhorted, long before there was any possibility of 
understanding, to be a good citizen, and in which the parents were reminded of 
their duties to train the child well. (Kitzinger, 1992:125) 
In a similar vein, former East Germany provided a state rite of passage for 
teenagers, described (by someone who had refused it) as a 'communist confirmation' 
- a parallel reflected not only in the ceremonial structure and commemorative family 
photographs but also by the fact that those who failed to observe it found it harder 
than those who did to gain access to the rights of an adult member of the community. 
Not only the cycles of individual lives, but also communal cycles of production 
and rest are subjected to reinterpretation: from revolutionary France to Soviet Russia 
and Communist China, superstition-hunting authorities have tried to wrench the 
week, month and year free from their agrarian and ritual associations, replacing the 
cyclic observation of the Sabbath and commemoration of the saints with industrial, 
religionless patterns (the French revolutionary ten-day week, the Soviet five-day 
week with a staggered day off) and commemoration of state events (May Day, China's 
Red Army Day) (Symons, 1992:204; Walzer, 1983: 195). Whether we look at personal 
rites of passage or at massive May Day celebrations, it becomes apparent that not 
atheism, but deification of the state comes, in such self-consciously corporatist 
secularism, to take the place of old-fashioned religion. 
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Two liberal neutralities 
The wall of separation 
To liberals, while the state should absent itself from religious controversy, it 
must certainly not go so far as to seek religion's active overthrow. Religious freedom, 
as Locke argued forcefully in the Letter Concerning Toleration and as numerous 
English dissenters had argued less famously before him, is best preserved in a state 
in which 'the care of souls cannot belong to the civil magistrate'(1895 [1689]:148). 
Indeed, from the secular, liberal state's refusal to take sides on matters of religion 
comes its guarantee of neutrality on other matters of conviction about the nature of 
a good life and thus its capacity to accommodate difference of many kinds1• 
This separation tends to be interpreted by modem, liberal states in either of 
two ways- or, frequently, in both at different moments. The first way is what D. E. 
Smith, in his study of Indian secularism, calls the 'wall of separation', where the 
state simply refuses to have anything at all to say on any religious question. In this 
model, people are quite free to hold personal religious views, but must leave them 
behind when they take part in public debate; and they cannot look to the state to 
preserve religious institutions or uphold religious values, unless those institutions 
and values can be justified in some entirely non-religious way ( eg Audi 1989 & 
1991). 
Yet in making that demand, a paradox arises. As Smith notes in the Indian 
context: 
Paradoxically, the secular state, in order to establish its sovereignty and confirm 
its secularity, is required to undertake the most basic possible reform of religion. 
It is called upon by the Constitution to strip Hinduism and Islam of the socio-
legal institutions which have distinguished them as total ways of life, to reduce 
these two great religious systems to their core of private faith, worship and 
practice.( 1963 :498) 
I have argued elsewhere that the same dilemma arises at least as strongly in 
the secular state's relations with indigenous Australian religious traditions: the 
western liberal model of state neutrality has its origins in the need to allow freedom 
for different strands of English Protestantism, a family of religious inclinations which 
almost uniquely (at least apart from quietist and anti-world 'sect-type' movements2) 
lend themselves to privatised and internalised understandings of the relation between 
religious belief and the wider world (M. Maddox 1997; 1998)3• For religious traditions 
other than Anglophone Protestantism to accommodate themselves to a secular state, 
they find themselves expected to take on some of the more privatising tendencies of 
that family of beliefs. We might see this approach as running into a specific, religious 
version of the dilemma which confronts libertarian, 'hands-off' models of the state 
on a number of fronts: namely, that what might appear to be a strong assertion of 
neutrality in practice can be interpreted as a strong endorsement for the already-
Volume 11, Number 2 101 
powerful and an abandoning of the weak. 
The even-handed helper 
The second way in which a secular liberal state can try to maintain its religious 
neutrality is by providing succour impartially to all the religious traditions found 
among its citizens. A straightforward example can be found in the recent decision 
by the University of Technology, Sydney, to add a Buddhist monk to its existing 
team of Christian, Jewish and Muslim chaplains. 
Such a direct 'equal time' approach to impartiality may not always be possible: 
providing equal respect or consideration for different traditions may mean, in practice, 
that some must be treated differently. Proponents of a model which sees the state as 
even-handed helper of all may find themselves impelled at times to stretch the concept 
of impartiality far enough to accommodate limited forms of differential treatment. 
An analogy here might be with affirmative action programs, in which some kind of 
differential treatment is deemed necessary in certain circumstances, so as to bring 
about greater equality in the long run. 
Instances of such slightly more involved interpretations of state neutrality can 
be found notably in some USA cases involving freedom of religion. In Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, for example, the court concluded that for Old Order Amish members' freedom 
of religion to be preserved, it was necessary for the state to bend its rules about 
compulsory high school education, allowing children from. that community to leave 
school at an age when all other children would still be compelled to attend. In such 
cases, state neutrality means not a 'wall of separation', but a responsibility on the 
state to protect various traditions' religious distinctiveness (see Galston 1995). 
Defenders of a high wall of separation would contend that even the most even-
handed helper has abandoned its responsibility to stay out of religious debates; while 
advocates of even-handedness would reply that no real wall can maintain effective 
separation: generalising from Smith's example, the harder the state tries to stay out 
of religion, the more it finds itself engaged in de facto religious reform. 
Political liberalism and state neutrality 
Perhaps the strongest contemporary statement of state neutrality as the way to 
accommodate difference comes in John Rawls's "political liberalism" (1995). Rawls's 
approach builds on the "wall of separation" model, but attempts to incorporate as 
much room as possible for the flourishing of difference. This leads him to develop 
an interestingly nuanced account of what it means for religious and political concerns 
to be held apart. 
Trying to avoid the construction of an all-encompassing world view, Rawls 
presents his position as a limited theory within which actual political dilemmas can 
be worked through. Citizens in a plural, democratic society will have different, often 
incompatible "comprehensive doctrines", religious, moral and philosophical, which 
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guide their private decision-making; but when they enter the public realm, they join 
a "political conception" which holders of reasonable comprehensive doctrines can 
endorse (1996:154-156). Rawls postulates a "public reason" accommodating an 
"overlapping consensus" of reasonable political conceptions. The best political system 
reflects "the essentials of a democratic regime", because that can be endorsed by 
"reasonable comprehensive doctrines"; and a reasonable comprehensive doctrine is 
one which can endorse such a regime. Any which do not are "unreasonable and 
irrational", or "even mad"; society's task is "to contain them" (1996:xix). 
Leaving to one side the apparent circularity of this position, with its comfortable 
account of what makes a comprehensive doctrine "reasonable", we may note other 
difficulties. A comprehensive doctrine may give rise to political conceptions which 
are fundamentally at variance with public reason, and yet be something which many 
liberals would stop short of calling "unreasonable and irrational" or "mad". Consider 
a religious tradition which locates spiritual significance not in a cognitive activity of 
believing which takes place inside the minds of believers (as in the Protestant model 
of privatised religion), but in the relationship between people and land. Suppose 
that commercial interests threaten serious damage to the land. Adherents of such a 
religious tradition cannot, without doing violence to its structure, participate in a 
public reason in which religious belief is supposed to stand apart from political 
conceptions. Their reasons for wanting the land's condition preserved just are 
religious; and yet those religious conceptions are not able to be bracketed, as political 
liberalism and its parent, the Protestant 'state neutrality' model, require. On the 
contrary, such religious conceptions extend into the material world. For the state to 
pronounce that they should not would mean that, far from remaining neutral with 
respect to religion, it would be imposing its own religious reformation, remaking 
indigenous traditions in the Protestant image. 
We can see this clearly in actual disputes. When such disputes erupt, 
commentators and polemicists of the right frequently give the impression that it is 
self-evident that all religious, moral and philosophical conceptions belong in the 
realm of the head rather than of the material world. In fact, however, western 
epistemologies acknowledge any number of conceptions whose location extends from 
the mind into the landscape or into tangible objects; probably the most basic is 
property rights, but one can readily think of others. 
The salient difference for the present argument is that the forms of religion 
familiar to a society like 1990s Australia and like Rawls's America, shaped by modem 
secularism nourished from Protestant roots, have grown used to conceiving themselves 
as removed from the material world, at least in the first instance. The religious 
conceptions of a land-based tradition, by contrast, have (in this limited and specific 
sense, namely, their capacity to extend from the mental landscape into the physical) 
more in common with some non-religious conceptions in western thought. They do 
not remain in the head; they stretch out into the land. 
Doctrines which do not remain in the head but extend into the material world 
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are hard to keep out of political debate - for example, about how material resources 
should be allocated. Yet many liberals would want to preserve indigenous and other 
'unbracketable' traditions, both for their importance to their own adherents and for 
the richness they contribute to the surrounding culture. They would feel that a range 
of reasons, from present-day respect to acknowledgment of the historical wrongs 
through which such traditions became marginalised in the first place, would prevent 
them endorsing Rawls's suggestion that comprehensive doctrines which cannot be 
bracketed from the process political contestation are unreasonable, irrational or mad. 
Rawls does not, of course, develop his argument along the lines canvassed 
here, and certainly makes no explicit charge of madness against indigenous traditions. 
His generally 'hands-off' approach makes concessions to the 'welfarist' or more 
intentionally interventionist liberal position by blending freedom with safeguards 
for the weakest through the exercise of public reason. Yet, although attempting to 
make room for diversity, the example of land-based traditions suggests that his 
conception of public reason itself is undermined by its limited assumptions about 
the nature of religion. 
What is a comprehensive doctrine? 
If political liberalism's conception of religion is too thin to accommodate the 
actual diversity of religious traditions, then a broader question emerges. If the aim is 
to remove "reasonable comprehensive doctrines" from the arena of political debate 
(so as to preserve their integrity outside it while allowing for overlapping public 
consensus inside it), what counts as a "doctrine"? Rawls offers the gloss that such 
views include the religious, moral and philosophical; but their relation to the material 
world in which political negotiation takes place is never made clear. Training our 
attention on the religious element of Rawls's triad, and leaving the philosophical 
and moral for another day, the example of land-based traditions suggests further 
challenges. 
Can a comprehensive doctrine have the real-world effect of requiring actual 
landscapes to be maintained in their present form, or does religious "doctrine" refer 
only to beliefs about the ancestor spirits who may be said to inhabit the landscape? 
Proponents of such a tradition might answer that the ancestor spirits' being is 
inseparable from the physical geography, and from the living community whose 
members are its custodians. In that case, the concept of "doctrine" would have to be 
extended beyond its usual, noetic sense to include the conditions for the physical 
preservation of the landscape and the flourishing of the community. 
But if that is so, cannot the hypothetical developers in such a story make a 
comparable claim? Perhaps they, too, could be said to hold a comprehensive moral 
and philosophical doctrine deserving consideration (whether it can be called religious 
is the question to which I shall tum below). They might appeal to a metaphysics of 
economic expansion which says that development is always an overriding good, not 
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only for them but for the whole community. If the beliefs of one group can be said to 
extend into the material world while still deserving respect as doctrines which merit 
respect in a plural polity, then why not those of their opponents? Yet the second set 
of beliefs is seldom treated as a metaphysics; it is just common sense, the reality of 
market forces, the way the world works. Economic growth and the ideology which 
promotes it are considered so foundational to capitalist societies that they hardly 
seem in need of any defence. Arguments about indigenous heritage protection are 
presented by their proponents as an attempt to claw back just a little of the authority 
which is otherwise invested bydefault in economic development. Yet when such 
arguments are couched in terms of the need to protect the integrity of religious 
doctrines even when they necessarily intersect with the material world, the same 
form of argument appears, superficially at least, to offer even more aid and comfort 
to defenders of the economic status quo. 
A defender of Rawls's position might reply here that to criticise it in this way 
is to confound the ideal and the real. Rawls's political liberalism is not meant to 
describe the world as it is, but only as it might go about fleshing out his conception 
of 'justice as fairness". It is not Rawls's fault, the defender might say, if a particular 
ideology of economic expansion has caught on in the world and is taking up more 
space in public reason than it is entitled to. Indeed, Rawls has said that 'justice as 
fairness" does not judge between capitalist and socialist economies as such (1973:274); 
we should not blame it for capitalism's present hold on the public imaginary. But 
that is just the problem: the divide which Rawls assumes between the doctrines 
through which people decide or find their position in relation to public reason and 
the material world within which that reason operates is predicated on a particular 
understanding of what makes a religious, philosophical or moral commitment. When 
we push that understanding only a little way, the divide no longer seems sustainable. 
Early liberalism's unconscious religion 
Few societies demonstrate the tensions inherent in a secular division between 
state and religion more clearly than the United States. To the historical memories of 
certain states' founding commitments to various kinds of (more or less inclusive) 
freedom of conscience, the USA has added the at times volatile mixture of 
constitutional guarantees of religious freedom and a robust civil religion. Delving 
into the roots of this concoction, William Connolly notes Tocqueville's observation 
that "Religion, which never intervenes directly in the government of American society, 
should therefore be considered as the first of their political institutions" (Tocqueville, 
quoted in Connolly 1995:169). Connolly glosses Tocqueville: 
Separation of church and state does not render the state neutral with respect to 
religion, nor does it sanction significant religious diversity ... Rather, [it] allows 
monotheism to install its effects in the hearts of the people and the presumptions 
of their institutions below the level of political debate. The mores of civilization 
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precede, ground, pervade, and restrict politics. Removing them from the clash 
and clang of politics preserves the sanctity of civilized religion and sets the 
boundaries of pluralism in the civi-theo-territorial culture. Separation of church 
and state enables Christian monotheism to form the first "political institution" 
above the fray of politics. (1995:169-170) 
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Here, then, is a further model of state secularism, one in which religion is 
contained "above" (or, in Connolly's metaphor, "below") politics, while remaining 
essential to it. Tocqueville's America and the various homes of intentional state 
atheism offer examples which challenge the assumptions of state secularism. In 
these instances, the apparently secular state is anything but: there is no such thing 
as an empty centre. 
Late liberalism's unconscious religion 
Late modem liberal societies owe something to the English Revolution, and 
something to Revolutionary France; they owe something to the traditions of early-
nineteenth century America which Tocqueville observed; if mostly negatively, they 
also have debts to their communist betes no irs. The lesson of attempts to distance 
the state from religion in each suggests that, without forgetting the differences, we 
should not too quickly accept any diagnosis of late modern, liberal societies as 
successfully secular. Instead, taking a cue from Connolly, it may be instructive to 
ask what, for them, occupies a structural position "in the hearts of the people and the 
presumptions of their institutions, below the threshold of political debate". 
Tipped off by the story of the developers and indigenous sacred heritage, we 
can find evidence of such a submerged theology in a variety of places. IfTocqueville's 
America achieved a separated state only by ignoring its foundation in Christian 
monotheism, and if the atheistic state replaces old-fashioned religion with self-
deification, the liberal capitalist state seems to offer the same structural position to 
the ideology of market economics. 
Of course, denunciation of the quest for commercial gain as a pseudo-religion 
has been part of the stock-in-trade of religious and social reformers at least since the 
Hebrew prophets' exhortations to place economic restitution ahead of financial gain, 
and certainly well before Jesus' more direct exhortations that one "cannot serve God 
and wealth" and his expulsion of money-changers from the temple. 
From another quarter, in what he thought, in 1944, was a requiem for free-
market economics, Karl Polanyi developed an extended metaphor to describe the 
competitive market system as having "a claim to universality unparalleled since the 
age when Christianity started on its career, only this time the movement was on a 
purely material level" (1944:130). In this system, "The middle class fulfilled their 
function by developing an all but sacramental belief in the universal beneficence of 
profits" (133). "Economic liberalism ... evolved into a veritable faith in man's secular 
salvation through a self-regulating market", while "the liberal creed assumed its 
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evangelical fervour only in response to the needs of a fully-deployed market economy" 
(135). Polanyi, whose interests are in economic history rather than religion, stops 
short of saying that the market is a religious phenomenon. The nearest he comes to 
such a suggestion is his closing comparison between socialism and fascism, on one 
hand, and market liberalism on the other. The difference, he says, is "moral and 
religious" rather than "economic", in that in the former two world-views "the reality 
of society is accepted with the finality with which the knowledge of death has moulded 
human consciousness" (258A), while a competitive market society sees society as 
an obstacle to freedom which must therefore be "liquidated" (165). 
I wish to argue something less bold than Biblical denunciators, and more 
precise than Polanyi: namely, that in the supposedly secular, proceduralist state, 
money is a strong enough organising principle to make any claim to an empty centre 
illusory. Polanyi, along with a majority of commentators from various disciplines, 
accepts the assumption that free market economics is only like a religion, because it 
operates on a "purely material level", while religion operates elsewhere (where, is 
less often specified). However, it is not at all clear that free market economics is 
restricted to the material; quite the reverse, it has a substantial ideal content. One 
way to test the claim that it belongs to the same family of meaning-systems as old-
fashioned religion is by subjecting the ideology of economic expansion to the classical 
materialist critiques of religion. Doing so, it becomes arguable that economic 
liberalism fits the materialists' descriptions, if anything, more closely than today's 
systems which are conventionally identified as religious. 
Taking first Feuerbach's projection theory of religion, we might conclude that 
in the modern, proceduralist state, it is market ideology which fits most accurately: 
the market, which is really a human creation, is unconsciously imagined into a real 
thing of which human beings then become the objects. It is described as active -
rising or falling, plunging or recovering; the subject of emotions - jittery, nervous, 
buoyant or confident; sometimes able to be calmed, or altered on its course, by 
human intervention, but often responding in unpredictable ways or acting according 
to its own caprice. It demands a restructuring of the rhythms of social and family 
life, and forms the focus of a comprehensive doctrine so pervasive that it can go 
unnoticed as its position at the centre of the 'secular' public imaginary is declared 
vacant. 
Whereas for Marx, borrowing and intensifying Feuerbach's projection theory, 
religion was the paradigmatic example of the inversion of which economics and the 
state are two more examples (see eg Kee 1990), for the modern, proceduralist state, 
free market ideology is the paradigm. It is the ideology of the market which can be 
described as the ''reversed world-consciousness" of a "reversed world", as "the general 
theory of that world, its encyclopaedic compendium, its logic in a popular form, its 
spiritualistic point d'honneur, its enthusiasm, its moral sanction, its solemn 
completion, its universal ground for consolation and justification" (Marx 1955:41). 
In contemporary, liberal, secular Australia, the family of meaning systems which 
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are usually called 'religion' amount to curiosities beside the thoroughgoing inversion 
of market ideology which structures increasing amounts of public reason. Indeed, 
Polanyi's assertion that a competitive market system mimics Christianity but "on a 
purely material level" distracts attention from the thoroughness of the inversion: 
what appear to be material considerations are in fact part of an ideological structure 
in which need or desire in the material world run a poor second. 
To take just one recent example, consider the current federal government's 
review of the Affirmative Action (Equal Opportunity for Women) Act 1986. It is 
being assessed, not for its effectiveness as a social justice measure, but as part of a 
larger process of reviewing Australian legislation which might have an impact on 
business's "competitiveness". The intriguing thing about the review is not so much 
that it should be undertaken in those terms as that the Issues Paper to which 
submissions are supposed to respond does not draw any distinction between "social 
justice" and "competition" as different classes of outcomes. Instead, it either ignores 
the idea that there might be a second criterion by which legislation could be judged 
(other than its effect on competitiveness), or else assumes that both aims can be 
served by the same legislation in the same way, without conflict. Competition in the 
market, in other words, is conceived as "moral sanction, solemn completion, universal 
ground for consolation and justification". 
As the atheistic state tries to replace religious rhythms and festivals with a 
seasonal round in its own image, so does the capitalist state. Industry groups such as 
the Business Council of Australia and the Confederation of Australian Industry 
have long lobbied for the abolition of weekends and holidays (Symons 1988:151). 
As a pre-Prime Ministerial John Howard put it in launching his party's industrial 
relations policy in 1992, 
If someone makes a capital investment in this country, they ought to be able to 
run that capital investment 24 hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a year, 
without penalty. (Quoted Brett 1996) 
At the output end, this shift to a perpetual working week is signalled in the 
loss of penalty rates for working (what used to be) after hours and weekends, while 
from the consumers' end extended shopping hours mean that there is never a break 
from the duty to keep the retail spending figures up. The removal of scheduled rest 
days which interfere with the ceaseless cycle of production and consumption is 
paralleled by the commercialisation of old festivals, and the creation of new, 
marketing-based celebrations such as Fathers Day. 
The capitalist, proceduralist state and old-fashioned 
religion 
Perhaps paradoxically, one way to see clearly the degree to which public reason 
is structured around a core of market ideology is by investigating its attitude to old-
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fashioned religion. A good example is the fate of theology in Australian universities. 
Early in Australia's academic history, a degree of rapprochement existed between 
universities and religion. Sydney University, inaugurated in 1852, became home to 
the teaching of Presbyterian theological students under the St Andrew's College Act 
1867 (Barnes and Ridings 1998:151), and began offering its own post-graduate 
Bachelor of Divinity in the 1930s (Chisholm 1963:81). To the south, the Melbourne 
College of Divinity was constituted by its own Act of Parliament in 1910 (Melbourne 
College of Divinity 1996-7:i). Thereafter, however, theological education was 
generally set up in institutions and according to curricula determined by churches, 
with academics paid out of church funds. As the ·state university system expanded, it 
remained chary of association with theological education; state sponsorship of 
theology (for example, as on the German model) was seen as a dangerous lunge 
away from state secularism. 
The 1980s and 1990s, however, saw a new generation of universities throw 
open their corridors to theology schools. You can now take a degree in Christian 
theology at Flinders, Murdoch, Charles Sturt or Griffith Universities. In 1993, the 
Melbourne College of Divinity became affiliated with the University of Melbourne 
(in whose residential colleges it is housed); the Sydney College of Divinity is 
developing associations with the University of Western Sydney and Charles Sturt 
University, as well as continuing to support the teaching of higher degrees in theology 
at Sydney University (the Sydney BD is no longer offered). The explanation is not to 
be found in any sudden thirst for theological insight among university administrations 
but in the increasing focus of universities on 'industry links': church-run colleges 
have been able to sell themselves to universities as providers of vocational education 
for a ready-made market. Any commitment to secularism crumbles before the stronger 
commitment to income generation. 
This displacement of the principle of secular education by the faith of the 
market can lead to further strange paradoxes. For example, at the state-funded 
University of South Australia, a non-sectarian degree program in Religion Studies 
has offered for the last couple of decades (through various institutional name changes 
and restructures) courses in comparative religion, philosophy of religion and ethics. 
Academic staff over the years have included those with strong personal religious 
commitments in various traditions and those who professed no religious adherence. 
Whatever their personal religious or non-religious leanings, all have tried to encourage 
in students a spirit of open-minded inquiry. The main client group for degrees and 
diplomas has been Roman Catholic school teachers, studying in order to teach 
religious education in Roman Catholic schools. To qualify for this purpose, courses 
must be approved by the Catholic Education Office, and that approval depends upon, 
inter alia, approval of the lecturers. And while the Catholic Education Office is 
quite happy for any qualified academic to teach its students the basics of Buddhism, 
say, or to guide them through sociological or philosophical theories of religion, my 
experience as a member of staff for five years was that certain 'core' subjects, like 
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systematic theology and biblical studies, could only be taught by an approved (usually 
Catholic) teacher. 
Consequently, non-Catholic staff with qualifications in various fields of theology 
were liable to find themselves unable to teach in their areas of expertise. While 
academics in principle retained autonomy over their own course content (subject to 
the usual processes of external review and accreditation), in practice the need for 
some courses to be approved for inclusion in a fee-paying Graduate Certificate in 
Catholic Studies saw instructions given, on at least one occasion, to modify course 
content to fit more closely with the magisterium's preferred approach. Academic 
independence in a state university gave way before the connection between EFTSUs 
and dollars. Intervention in curriculum came not because of any commitment to 
Roman Catholic orthodoxy on the part of the university administration or government, 
but, on the contrary, was made possible by the fact that the university's separation 
from the institutions of old-fashioned religion had progressed so far that churches 
could be seen as just another industry. Meanwhile, the wider society's "logic in a 
popular form, its spiritualistic point d'honneur, its enthusiasm, its moral sanction, 
its solemn completion, its universal ground for consolation and justification" made 
academic enquiry answerable to the new orthodoxy of accountants' tallyings. 
This theology of the market means that, presumably, the university would 
have been equally happy to offer doctrinally-based and religiously-sanctioned courses 
in any other religion's theology, if a sufficient market had offered. Yet the intervention 
in curriculum, and qualified academics' inadmissibility as teachers in their fields of 
expertise, indicate that the market's agnosticism on matters of old-fashioned faith 
does not denote an 'empty centre', but rather, a centre firmly occupied by a value 
system which can accommodate what pays. 
To summarise, the two approaches which I have identified in the 'secular 
liberal' family of interpretations of the possible relationships between the state and 
religious traditions and institutions run into problems. The 'wall of separation' model 
paradoxically makes the state an agent of religious reform, espaliering the traditions 
it encounters so that they can be contained on the opposite side of the wall. A model 
which tries to peek over the wall far enough to encourage the flourishing of religious 
diversity faces dilemmas about which traditions to compost, which to prune and 
which to let wither or be damaged by pests. 
Further, any analysis which takes place purely at the culturalist and ideological 
level of most discussions of sacred-secular distinctions risks overlooking the fact 
that their framework comes from a particular religious tradition, namely, 
Protestantism. It is a tradition which has taken to the highest level of refinement its 
capacity for being wrenched free from any material reference; and one which has 
enjoyed a degree of historical privilege within the societies out of which the principle 
of secularism has grown, such that its own material commitments are able to be 
overlooked, sinking into the cultural background and being taken for granted as 
natural. Most religious traditions do not share Protestantism's capacity for removal 
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from material commitments; and, figuring in liberal, secular societies as Other (if 
not as downright mad), their material commitments stand out from the cultural 
background, demanding attention and threatening disruption. 
This threatened disruption presses most nearly when it throws into relief the 
real "comprehensive doctrine" through which the culture and public reason of 
proceduralist, secular society are formed, namely, the ideology of the market. 
Postscript: philosophy of religion in search of a home 
In recent years, philosophy of religion has turned a critical eye on itself, and, 
if the number of proposals for self-improvement is any guide, has found itself wanting. 
Ninian Smart has suggested an "extension" of philosophy of religion away 
from a preoccupation with Christian theism and even beyond the study of religions 
themselves, to "the philosophy of worldviews" (1995). Imagining an opportunity to 
"rearrange academe", Smart envisages "chunks of anthropology, the history of ideas, 
sociology, area studies, iconography and religious studies grouped together", 
surmounted at a "'higher' logical level" by "the reflection on world views which 
would constitute quite a large slice of philosophy" (1997:10). 
Smart's program is not shared by Michael Levine, who nevertheless agrees in 
seeing "contemporary 'analytic' Christian philosophy of religion" as a "moribund 
and isolated field within philosophy, a field as inbred as the Spanish Bourbons" 
(Levine, 1997: 11 ). For Levine, relief is already in sight in the form of "cross-cultural 
philosophy of religion as practised" (1997: 20), but it still shares in "the 
methodological disarray that currently afflicts, and is seen to be undermining, the 
history of religions, comparative philosophy, and religious studies generally". Far 
from alleviating such disarray, Levine sees in Smart's suggestions "further evidence" 
of it (Levine 1997: 22). 
Following from the argument in this paper, I want to suggest that one fruitful 
way for philosophy of religion to understand itself is in conversation with political 
philosophy. From political philosophy's side, it can be pointed out that in the history 
of western reflections about the nature of a good and just society, religious language 
and assumptions have seldom been very far away (G. Maddox 1996). Even when 
political philosophers deliberately try to distance themselves from religious 
considerations and produce explicitly secular theory, the concepts of secularism which 
frame such discussions paradoxically owe their genesis to a particular set of 
theological developments: modern secularism cannot dust off the Reformation's 
fingerprints (M. Maddox 1996, 1997). From religion's side, I suggest that debates 
about the proper pattern of relations between the state and religious institutions 
provide a vantage-point from which philosophers of religion might see a path which 
could lead beyond Bourbonesque introspection or reliving family battles past. 
To do so, philosophy of religion would need to move beyond the ocular metaphor 
implied in Smart's appeal to a philosophy ofworldviews. A viewer stands at a distance 
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from the viewed object, and can penetrate no further than its surface. As long as 
such metaphors persist, religion and associated meaning systems will continue to be 
understood according to the noetic model which, I have suggested, allows important 
areas to be overlooked. 
While philosophers of religion have lamented their discipline's retreat into 
metaphysical abstraction, similar complaints have come from some political 
philosophers (eg Barber 1988), who argue that the quest for seamless theory which 
has characterised much political thought has little to do with the real world of 
"reflective disequilibrium", which, parodying Rawls, he sees as the arena in which 
political interactions take place. 
Yet, at their best, both religion and politics have their feet firmly in that very 
disequilibrium. Both are to do with people's deepest commitments and profoundest 
longings, and with the criticism of what is, even if we cannot be entirely sure what 
should be. Both are periodically said to have fallen into decay, or to have lost their 
relevance to the modem world; certainly, both have lost authority before the colonising 
theology of the market. The retreat into theoretical abstraction which critics have 
seen in recent political philosophy and philosophy of religion might be understood 
in part as a reaction to this loss. of authority; perhaps scholasticism offers a more 
manageable alternative to the messy realities in which their subjects deal. If this is 
so, conversation between the two might offer a promising way back to engagement. 
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Notes 
1. For conventional statements of this view of religious neutrality as the ground of other 
liberal freedoms, see eg Kymlicka 1995; Galston 1995:518. 
2. The distinction is from Troeltsch 1960 [1908-11]. 
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3. I am not suggesting that Protestantism necessarily refuses engagement with the world -
see, among numerous sources, the papers by Dutney, R. Smith and G. Maddox in this volume. 
Rather, I am arguing that Protestantism's emphasis on the cognitive activities of belief over 
other forms of religious expression (such as ritual, mythic and so on) allow, at times, for a 
privatised interpretation. This division remains, even when the content of the beliefs has a 
social focus: a Protestant, asked to justify her social activism, would be quite likely to reply 
something like, "I act this way because I believe that that is what God requires of me". If 
pressed, she might elaborate, "My study of the Bible and of my denomination's tradition has 
led me to decide that this is the right thing to do". It is this cognitive emphasis in the structure 
of Protestant piety, rather than any particular content about the rightness or wrongness of 
social engagement, which I identify as critical to the project of separating religion from political 
process. 
